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Abstract 
Low ecological validity is a common limitation in deception studies. The present study 
investigated the real life, high stake context of public appeals for help with missing or murdered 
relatives.  Behaviours which discriminated between honest and deceptive appeals included some 
previously identified in research on high stakes lies (deceptive appeals contained more equivocal 
language, gaze aversion, head shaking, and speech errors), and a number of previously unidentified 
behaviours (honest appeals contained more references to norms of emotion/behaviour, more 
expressions of hope of finding the missing relative alive, more expressions of positive emotion 
towards the relative, more expressions of concern/pain, and an avoidance of brutal language). Case 
by case analyses yielded 78% correct classifications. Implications are discussed with reference to 
the importance of using ecologically valid data in deception studies, the context specific nature of 
some deceptive behaviours, and social interactionist, and individual behavioural profile, accounts 
of cues to deception. 
 
 
Key words: deception; lie detection; high stakes lies 
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High Stakes Lies: Verbal and Nonverbal Cues to Deception in Public Appeals for Help 
with Missing or Murdered Relatives 
 
Meta-analyses of several decades of research into deception have produced two major findings; 
these are that cues to deception tend to be unreliable and weak (DePaulo et al., 2003), and, in 
general, people are poor at detecting lies (Bond & DePaulo, 2006).  For example, in DePaulo et 
al.’s (2003) meta-analysis of cues to deception, the duration and/or frequency of only a few of the 
behaviours investigated emerged as useful in discriminating between deceptive and truthful 
communication.  Also, effect sizes were generally small (median d = 0.10), suggesting that these 
cues are weak and may be difficult to use in real life contexts.  Bond and DePaulo’s (2006) meta-
analysis of deception detection indicated that people are generally poor at detecting lies, barely 
performing above chance.  Hence, although a few groups and individuals who are able to detect 
deception have been identified (for example, Bond, 2008; O’Sullivan & Ekman, 2004), accurate 
detection does not appear to be the norm.  These findings are obviously related; if the differences 
in behaviours between liars and truth-tellers are often inconsistent and small, they are likely to be 
difficult to detect and use in real life.  However, so far, most deception research has been confined 
to laboratory based studies, involving low stakes lies (DePaulo & Morris, 2004; Frank & Svetieva, 
2012; Granhag & Stromwall, 2004; Porter & ten Brinke, 2010; Vrij, 2004). Because laboratory 
experiments are limited by ethical considerations, the lies employed tend not to be of a serious 
nature and do not have serious consequences.  Moreover, there is little motivation for liars to 
succeed in the lie, and liars are often instructed to lie by the experimenter and so are not responsible 
for their lies.  Consequently, although the findings of these studies may be applicable to the low 
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stakes situations in which they were carried out, they may be less relevant to more high stakes 
situations, such as forensic contexts.  
 This may be particularly important as DePaulo and Morris (2004) have suggested that 
highly charged situations in which motivation is strong, and consequences are serious, may 
produce more reliable cues to deception.  For example, DePaulo et al. (2003) found that strong 
motivation to succeed in the lie, and lies about transgressions, were both moderating factors that 
produced more prominent cues to deception (even in relatively low stakes situations).  And 
correspondingly, as these factors are more likely to emerge in high stakes situations than in 
laboratory studies, one might expect high stakes situations to produce more prominent and reliable 
cues to deception.  However, although some efforts have been made to develop more ecologically 
valid paradigms using antisocial deception, for example, unsanctioned lying about cheating on an 
experimental task (Blair, Levine & Shaw, 2010; Feeley & deTurck, 1998), and participating in 
mock crimes (Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall & Kronkvist, 2006; Kassin & Fong, 1999), it is 
unclear how closely these paradigms mirror the motivation and consequences of deception in high 
stakes contexts.  In general, research focusing on real life, high stakes lies is relatively scant, and 
investigation of the complexities of deceptive behaviour in real world settings, particularly in high 
stakes forensic contexts, is nascent.  
There are a number of factors related to lying that might be more pronounced in more 
ecologically valid contexts; these include, the effects of cognitive load, affect, arousal and 
impression management.  For instance, a number of researchers have suggested that lying may be 
intrinsically more cognitively demanding than truth-telling, as the liar has to create novel material, 
remember what he or she has said, monitor how he or she is self-presenting to others, monitor the 
receiver’s reactions, and simultaneously lie and suppress the truth.  This may result in an increase 
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in behaviours related to cognitive load during acts of deception, such as, speech disruptions and 
errors, gaze aversion, and a reduction in illustrators (see, for example, Vrij & Mann, 2001a; Vrij 
et al., 2008; Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1981).  In addition, a number of affective responses 
have been hypothesised to relate to lying; these range from guilt, fear, shame, and anxiety, to 
excitement in duping the receiver of the lie (Ekman, 1992; Zuckerman et al., 1981), all of which 
may produce behaviours related to the affective experience, and which liars may attempt to 
conceal.  However, it has been suggested that liars may ‘leak’ evidence of these emotions in the 
form of facial expressions which they are unable to fully suppress (Ekman, 1992; ten Brinke & 
Porter, 2012).  The psychological discomfort or excitement produced by acts of deception may 
also result in greater autonomic arousal (Zuckerman et al., 1981), in particular, physiological 
reactions related to activation of the sympathetic nervous system, such as, increased perspiration, 
blood pressure, heart rate, and respiration rates (Koper & Sahlman, 1991).  Liars may also attempt 
to control their behaviour in an effort to suppress signs of deception, and simultaneously behave 
in a credible manner (Zuckerman et al., 1981); this may paradoxically result in behaviours that 
appear stilted or false.  For example, liars may appear rigid or inhibited (Vrij, 2004), or may 
produce fake facial expressions which do not match the emotion they are claiming to experience 
(ten Brinke & Porter, 2012). 
Nevertheless, although one might expect such factors to be exaggerated in high stakes 
contexts, the few studies which have investigated cues relating to deception in real life, high stakes 
lies, have produced mixed results. For example, in a study investigating naturally occurring, high 
motivation deceptive communication, Koper and Sahlman (1991) found that liars were perceived 
to be more tense than truth-tellers; however, Mann and Vrij (2006) found that real life police 
suspects were perceived to be more tense when telling the truth than when lying.  These 
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contradictory findings may, in part, be due to a lack of contextual focus; i.e. lies in different high 
stakes contexts may have differing motivational, emotional and cognitive correlates.  Indeed, a 
number of researchers have suggested that a range of situational factors may affect the production 
and salience of cues related to deception (see, for example, Porter & ten Brinke, 2010; Sporer & 
Schwandt, 2006; Vrij & Mann, 2004).  For instance, in their study of 911 homicide calls, Harpster, 
Adams and Jarvis (2009) found 19 behaviours that discriminated between innocent callers 
requesting help, and callers who were actually involved in the homicide which they were reporting.  
However, a number of these were likely to have been context specific (for example; acceptance of 
death, location in the call of the plea for help).  This suggests that a more contextual focus might 
be beneficial when examining high stakes lies.  
As an illustration of this, Wright Whelan (2009) found that a number of cues to deception 
were not consistent across two high stakes, forensic contexts; these contexts were false public 
appeals for help with missing or murdered relatives, and false confessions.  Thus, whereas false 
appealers were perceived as having significantly higher vocal pitch, more hesitant speech, less 
direct voices and more gaze aversion than truthful appealers, false confessors produced none of 
the cues to deception investigated in the study.  
Nevertheless, some studies have suggested that there may be some deception related 
behaviours that can occur consistently across high stakes situations.  These include, increases in 
speech errors (Davis, Markus, Walters, Vorus & Connors, 2005; Vrij & Mann, 2001a), word or 
phrase repetition (Davis et al, 2005; Harpster et al., 2009; Vrij & Mann, 2001a), the use of 
equivocal or tentative language (Adams & Jarvis, 2006; ten Brinke & Porter, 2012), head shaking 
(Davis et al., 2005; Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2006) and gaze aversion (Vrij & Mann, 2001a; Wright 
Whelan, 2009).  Typical theoretical explanations of these results have invoked the kinds of factors 
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mentioned earlier, either singly, or in combination; i.e. cognitive load, arousal, affective factors 
and impression management.  For example, gaze aversion has been related to cognitive load (Vrij 
& Mann, 2001a), emotional responses such as shame (DePaulo et al., 2003), guilt (Ekman, 1992), 
and attempts by liars to be evasive and distance themselves from their communications 
(Zuckerman et al., 1981).  Speech disfluency or disturbance has also variously been related to 
anxiety (Davis et al., 2005) and cognitive load (Vrij & Mann, 2001a).  However, it is possible that 
these factors not only coexist but may interact; for example, anxiety may not only affect responses 
commonly associated with stress and tension, but may also increase cognitive load.  The majority 
of the tasks identified as increasing cognitive load in liars could be described as ‘frontal’ tasks; i.e. 
they are likely to involve the frontal areas of the brain typically associated with making planned 
or ‘executive’ decisions.  As such, performance of such tasks will likely be made more difficult by 
increases in anxiety and arousal, producing symptoms that are intrusive and ‘overload’ the brain’s 
executive capacity (Wagstaff, et al., 2008).   
 Given these considerations, the purpose of the current study was to investigate cues to 
deception in a real life, high stakes, situation, with a specific, defined, context.  To this end, video 
footage was used of people appearing before the press and making public appeals for help in 
finding out what happened to a missing or murdered relative.  Approximately half of the appealers 
were later convicted in the death or disappearance of their relative, and half were not involved in 
the death or disappearance of their relative.  
 As several researchers have advocated a multi-cue approach to deception detection (for 
example, ten Brinke & Porter, 2012; Vrij & Mann, 2004), three analyses are described; the first, 
concerned verbal behaviours, the second, nonverbal behaviours, and the third was a case by case 
analysis to assess the potential of each cue to predict veracity.  On the basis of previous research,  
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it was expected that some general cues to deception, previously identified in high stakes situations, 
would also generalise to this appeals context; for example, speech errors, gaze aversion, 
equivocation and head shaking.  However, it was also expected that there may exist cues related 
more specifically to the context of making an appeal, which have not previously been identified.  
Finally, it was predicted that a combination of cues might be more effective in detecting deception 
than any individual cue (see, for example, ten Brinke & Porter, 2012; Vrij & Mann, 2004).  
 
Method 
Materials  
Video footage of people making public appeals for help with missing or murdered relatives was 
collected from various news and media sites from the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada and New Zealand.  One of the problems inherent in research using real life lies is the 
problem of determining ground truth; for instance, the fact that an individual may be found guilty 
or not guilty by a court may not of itself be a reliable indicator that he or she committed the 
offense in question. To address this concern, cases were included in the final selection only if 
they satisfied the criteria used in other published research in this area by Vrij and Mann (2001b), 
and ten Brinke and Porter (2012). Hence, appealers were classified as honest or deceptive only if 
there was overwhelming evidence indicating the extent of their involvement in the death or 
disappearance of their relative using these criteria. Such evidence included: forensic evidence 
(for example, soil traces, pollen traces, fibers linking the accused to the crime scene, blood 
spatter patterns); presence of the victim’s blood (for example, in the car or home of the accused); 
other DNA linking the accused to the crime (for example, skin, hair, body fluids); footage from 
security cameras, CCTV, police surveillance videos, and speed cameras (for example, CCTV of 
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the accused dumping the body of the victim); knowledge of the location of the missing person’s 
body; knowledge of unreleased or undiscovered details of the crime (for example, knowledge of 
the cause of death before the body was found by police); confessions which included intimate 
knowledge of the crime and were not recanted; admission at trial (for example, admitting guilt 
and apologizing to family members); post mortem evidence ( for example, evidence that the 
victim could not have been alive at a time when the accused claimed that he or she was alive); 
medical evidence (for example, expert testimony that it was impossible for a person to be 
rendered unconscious for 10 hours by a drug administered in a way that the accused claimed); 
computer search history of the location of the crime or of the body (for example, zoomed-in 
satellite images before the relative was reported missing, of the exact, remote location where the 
body was later found); eyewitness testimony (for example, identifying the accused at the crime 
scene); possession of the murder weapon; possession of items from the crime scene; phone 
records; incriminating financial transactions; and an account of events, or an alibi, inconsistent 
with the evidence (for example, a man claiming to have spent the morning searching for his wife, 
when CCTV footage shows him taking a mattress to a dumpster, and till receipts show that he 
then purchased a new mattress.  His wife’s body was later found wrapped in a bloody part of a 
mattress).  The large majority of cases involved multiple pieces of evidence as described above.  
Following the protocol established by ten Brinke and Porte (2012), Table 1 provides a summary 
of the types of evidence used to classify cases as deceptive or honest. 
Thirty two appeals were accordingly included in the final selection, 16 deceptive and 16 
honest.  All the appeals were made within a short time frame after the relative went missing or 
was murdered.  In the group of appeals classified as deceptive, in  all cases except one,  the 
appealer had also been convicted in a criminal court of involvement in the death (or kidnapping, 
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in one case) of their relative.  The exception concerned a mother suspected of killing her missing 
child who led police to the child’s body, buried in a remote location, whilst she was under 
surveillance, and, at the time of writing, she is currently awaiting trial charged with murder.  In 
the group of appeals classified as honest, in 12 of the cases another person has been convicted of 
the death of the appealers’ relative, and in three cases the relative was found with no evidence of 
foul play.  The remaining case classified as honest was that of a father who made an appeal for 
help when his daughter disappeared whilst in the care of her mother, from whom he was 
separated.  CCTV footage from the day the girl was reported missing clearly shows a man, an 
acquaintance of the girl’s mother, carrying the girl down a hotel corridor.  In an affidavit for a 
warrant to search the man’s car, investigators stated that the man admitted that he collected the 
girl from her home and drove her to the hotel.  The girl’s body was found shortly afterwards.  
The man was charged with first degree murder, rape of a child and kidnapping, the mother was 
charged with murder, human trafficking, child abuse involving prostitution, and filing a false 
police report, and at the time of writing they are awaiting trial.  The father who made the appeal 
lived in a different state to his daughter, was never named as a person of interest or a suspect in 
the case, and the CCTV footage from the hotel clearly shows with whom his daughter was just 
before she died.   
The status of the relative (missing or dead) was balanced between the honest and 
deceptive groups; in both the deceptive and honest groups there were 10 cases in which the 
relative’s body had not been found (relative missing and not publicly known to be dead), and six 
cases in which the body had been found (relative publicly known to be dead).  
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Analysis 1: Verbal Cues 
The first analysis concerned verbal behaviours. Seventeen cues were investigated.  Of these, six 
were expected to relate to honesty. Four of these first six cues were derived from a study by 
Wright Whelan (2012), which looked at the cues that accurate detectors said they used in 
discriminating between liars and truthtellers. With the exception of  the cue ‘plea for help’, 
which was also identified by Harpster et al. (2009) in their study of  911 homicide calls, to the 
best of our knowledge, none of these six cues has previously been identified in the literature. 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that honest appealers would be more likely to show expressions 
of positive emotion towards the relative (including describing the relative in positive terms, 
expressions of love, and terms of endearment), avoid the use of brutal language (for example, 
saying ‘gone’ or ‘taken from us’ instead of ‘murdered’), and, in cases where the body of the 
relative had not been found, express hope of finding the missing person alive (for example, ‘I 
think that she’s out there’ and ‘I’m waiting for you honey’), and make a plea for help or for the 
relative to return (for example, ‘please come back’ and ‘if you have any information, please 
come forward’).  A further two possible cues related to honesty were noticed by the researcher 
whilst examining the appeals and were included in the analysis.  Accordingly, it was also 
hypothesized that honest appealers would be more likely to show expressions of concern for the 
relative, or of grief, or pain (for example, ‘we just want to know she’s all right’ and ‘this has 
distressed all of our family’), and references to norms of emotion or behaviour, including 
violations of norms (for example ‘how could anybody do this’ and ‘any parent knows how we 
feel’).     
The other 11 verbal cues selected were expected to relate to deception; i.e. it was 
specifically hypothesized that deceivers would show more of the following behaviours.  Of 
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these, four were selected as they have been found to discriminate between honesty and deception 
in previous research by other authors on real life, high stakes lies in other contexts; these were, 
equivocation, including words or phrases that minimise or convey uncertainty or vagueness, for 
example, ‘just’, ‘kind of’, ‘possibly’, ‘a bit’ (Adams & Jarvis, 2006; ten Brinke & Porter, 2012); 
speech errors, including grammatical errors and incomplete words and sentences (Davis et al., 
2005; Vrij & Mann, 2001a); phrase repetition (Davis et al., 2005; Harpster et al., 2009); and 
filled pauses i.e. non lexical sounds, for example, ‘um’ and ‘er’ (Davis et al., 2005).  
All of the remaining seven cues to deception were again selected as they had been 
identified in the study by Wright Whelan (2012) as cues that accurate detectors said they used in 
discriminating between liars and truthtellers in appeals; and also again, to the best of our 
knowledge, none of these seven cues has previously been identified in the literature on high 
stakes lies. Thus it was hypothesized that deceptive appealers would be more likely to use a 
sentence or make a statement that does not make sense (illogical or unclear), avoid first person 
pronouns (for example, ‘Just want her back’), refer to other people or groups of people (not 
including the police or family), in cases in which the relative was not publicly known to be dead, 
express a lack of hope of finding the missing person alive (for example, ‘nothing can be done to 
make things better’), use lists (for example, of people, actions, emotions), make irrelevant 
statements (extraneous information, outside the context of the incident), and use brutal language 
or detail about the relative ( for example, ‘blood’ and ‘murdered’). It can be noted, therefore, that 
actuarial rather than theoretical prediction provided the primary rationale for the inclusion of 
these cues at this stage; possible theoretical explanations for their efficacy are explored later. 
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Procedure for verbal cues 
The 32 video clips of truthful and deceptive appeals were transcribed, and then one coder 
counted frequencies of the selected verbal behaviours in the transcripts, and a second coder, who 
was blind to the veracity of the appeals, coded a random sample of 25% of the deceptive appeals 
and 25% of the truthful appeals.  Both coders were researchers studying deception.  Inter-rater 
reliabilities for the frequency counts were high, ranging from r = .90 to r = 1; for 12 of the 17 
cues, r was 1 (see Table 2).  In two cases, inter-rater reliability could not be computed because at 
least one variable was constant (due to floor effects).  Given the high inter-rater reliability for the 
random sample, frequency counts produced by the rater who had coded all of the transcripts were 
used in all analyses. 
 
  
Results for verbal cues 
Preliminary analyses revealed no overall effect of the length of the appeals, as measured by word 
count, on veracity (i.e. whether the appeal was truthful or deceptive), F (1, 31) = 0.01, p = .99.  
However, to account for the differing lengths of the appeals (15 - 336 words, M = 110.81, SD = 
80.64), each cue score for each appeal was divided by the word count for the particular appeal 
and multiplied by 100  to produce a percentage frequency score. 
 To investigate which cues were associated with honesty, a MANOVA with veracity as a 
between subjects independent variable, was conducted on the percentage frequency counts for 
the following cues: expressions of positive emotion towards the relative, avoids brutal language 
or detail, makes a plea, expressions of concern, grief, or pain, and references to norms of 
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emotion or behaviour.  Means, standard deviations, confidence intervals, and effect sizes are 
shown in Table 2. 
 Using Pillai’s Trace, the multivariate test was significant, F (1, 26) = 13.16, p = .033, and 
a series of follow up, univariate analyses was conducted.  As hypothesized, there was a 
significant effect for ‘references to norms of emotion or behaviour’; truthful appeals contained a 
larger proportion of references to norms than deceptive appeals. The cue, ‘expressions of 
concern, grief, or pain’, also approached significance (p = .032, one-tailed); again, as 
hypothesized, truthful appeals contained a larger proportion of expressions of concern, grief, or 
pain than deceptive appeals. 
 The cue ‘avoids brutal language or detail’ also approached significance (p = .038, one-
tailed); however, it was assumed that this cue might be affected by the status of the appealer’s 
relative; i.e. appealers would be more likely to use this cue more frequently in cases where the 
relative was publicly known to be dead.  Accordingly, a 2 x 2 ANOVA (veracity x status) was 
conducted on the data.  This showed significant effects for veracity (F (1, 28) = 5.52, p = .042) 
and status (F (1, 28) = 8.21, p = .008).  As predicted, appeals for help with dead relatives (M = 
1.52, SD = 1.66) contained a larger proportion of avoidance of brutal language than appeals for 
help with missing relatives (M = 0.32, SD = 0.81).  The interaction between veracity and status 
was not significant (F < 1). 
 As the cue ‘expressions of hope of finding the relative alive’, would also not be relevant 
in cases where the relative was publicly known to be dead, a separate analysis was conducted for 
this cue using only cases in which the relative was missing (i.e. no body had been found).  Ten 
deceptive appeals and 10 honest appeals were included in this analysis.  A one way ANOVA 
(with veracity as the factor) showed, as expected, that honest appeals (M = 2.27, SD = 1.91) 
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contained a significantly higher proportion of expressions of hope than deceptive appeals (M = 
0.63, SD = 0.94), F (1, 19) = 5.96, p = .025. 
Although the cue ‘positive emotion expressed towards the relative’ did not discriminate 
significantly using the mean percentage scores (see Table 2), examination of the data showed 
that an extreme outlier was producing a very pronounced skew in the data (one deceptive 
appealer produced a very high number of expressions of positive emotion towards his fiancé).  
Consequently, this cue was also coded dichotomously as present/absent, and a further binary 
analysis was conducted.  This yielded a significant result in the predicted direction; expressions 
of positive emotion were more likely to be present in honest appeals (n = 11 or 69%) than in 
deceptive appeals (n = 5 or 31%), χ2(1) = 4.50, p = .034. 
 To investigate which cues were associated with deception, two separate MANOVAs, 
with veracity as a between subjects independent variable, were conducted on the percentage 
frequency scores of the cues.  One was conducted on the four cues identified in previous research 
on high stakes lies (equivocation, speech errors, phrase repetition, and filled pauses), and the 
other was conducted on the seven cues suggested in the study by Wright Whelan (2012) which 
focused specifically on appeals (sentence or statement that does not make sense, avoids using 
first person pronoun, referring to others, lists, irrelevant statements, and using brutal language or 
detail). 
 Using Pillai’s Trace, the multivariate test on the cues identified in previous research on 
high stakes lies was not significant, F (1, 27) = 1.63, p = .196.  However, it can be noted that all 
the cues had means in the expected direction, and two of the cues, equivocation and speech 
errors, had substantial effect sizes, particularly the former (see Table 2).  Consequently, 
notwithstanding the lack of significance of the overall MANOVA, the cue ‘equivocation’ was 
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also analyzed individually; as predicted, deceptive appeals contained a significantly higher 
proportion of equivocal language than honest appeals, F (1, 31) = 4.79, p = .036. 
 The multivariate test on the cues suggested in the study by Wright Whelan (2012),  
sentence or statement that does not make sense, avoids using first person pronoun, referring to 
others, lists, irrelevant statements, and using brutal language or detail, was not significant, F (1, 
25) = 1.06, p = .411.  
 As the cue ‘lack of hope of finding the relative alive’, would not be relevant in cases 
where the relative was publicly known to be dead, this was not included in the MANOVA; 
instead a separate analysis was conducted for this cue using only cases in which the relative was 
missing (i.e. no body had been found).  However, a one way ANOVA (with veracity as the 
factor) was not significant, F (1, 19) = 1.00, p = .331.  
 Taken together, although not all were significant individually, these results could be 
considered to broadly support the hypotheses. Indeed, 15 were in the hypothesized directions, 
which is, in itself, significant by binomial test (p<.003). 
 
 
Analysis 2: Nonverbal Cues 
 The behaviours used in the second analysis were four nonverbal behavioural cues to deception 
identified in previous research on real life, high stakes lies, but subject to restrictions placed by 
the quality of footage available.  For example, although a decrease in blink rate (Mann, Vrij & 
Bull, 2002), and in self-adaptor and illustrator gestures (Koper & Sahlman, 1991), have been 
found to relate to deception, the clarity of the video clips was often not sufficient to measure 
blink rate, and often the hands were not visible.  Hence, on the basis of previous findings it was 
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hypothesized that deceptive appealers would show more gaze aversion, headshaking and 
shrugging.  
Gaze aversion was used despite mixed findings in the literature (for example, Akehurst, 
Kohnken, Vrij & Bull, 1996), as there is some evidence that this cue may discriminate in 
situations where the motivation to succeed in lying is high (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij & Mann, 
2001a; Wright Whelan, 2009).  Appealers were coded as averting their gaze when they were not 
looking directly at the cameras or interviewer, but instead looked down, up, or to the side.  
Appealers who were wearing sunglasses or hats so that their eyes were not visible, or whose eye-
line was unclear, were not included in the analysis (three deceptive appealers and two truthful 
appealers were excluded for this reason). Appealers who were reading a statement were also not 
included in the analysis of gaze aversion, as this was considered to be a form of gaze aversion 
not indicative of factors that may be related to deception.  One of the 16 deceptive appealers was 
reading a statement, and eight of the truthful appealers were reading a statement.  Research by 
other authors has also identified head shaking, i.e. a side to side motion, and increased shrugging 
( Davis et al., 2005; Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2006) as indicators of deception, though it was not 
possible to code the latter  in three of the deceptive appeals as the shoulders were not visible.   
 
Procedure for nonverbal cues 
The stimuli were the same video clips used in Analysis 1. Again one coder counted frequencies 
of predetermined nonverbal behaviours in the 32 video clips and, as in the first study, a second 
coder, who was blind to the veracity of the appeals, coded a random sample of 25% of the 
deceptive appeals and 25% of the truthful appeals.  Inter-rater reliability for the frequency counts 
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was again high, ranging from r = .93 to r = 1 (see Table 2), so again the frequency counts 
produced by the rater who had coded all the transcripts were used in all analyses.  
 
Results for nonverbal cues 
Preliminary analyses of the nonverbal cues again revealed no effect of the length of the appeals 
on veracity, F (1, 31) = 0.10, p = .757; however, to account for the differing lengths of the 
appeals (11 - 158 seconds, M = 50.17, SD = 34.82), each cue score for each appeal was divided 
by the length (in seconds) of the appeal, to produce a percentage frequency score.  
 It was not possible to conduct a MANOVA on these data, because, as discussed earlier, 
not all cues were visible in all the appeals.  Consequently, to investigate cues associated with 
deception, a series of one way ANOVAs, with veracity as a between subjects factor, was 
conducted on the adjusted frequency counts.  Means, standard deviations, confidence intervals, 
and effect sizes are also shown in Table 2. 
 Results indicated that deceptive appealers produced significantly more gaze aversion (F 
(1, 19) = 7.16, p = .016), and head shakes (F (1, 31) = 4.32, p = .046), than honest appealers.  
However, no difference was found for shrugging. (Because of small and unequal sample sizes in 
some cases, all analyses were repeated using non-parametric tests, with equivalent results.) 
 
 
Analysis 3: Case by case analysis 
As an additional way of construing the same data, a case by case analysis was also conducted to 
assess the potential of each cue found to be significant to predict veracity. This idea has been 
used previously in the literature (see, for example, Ekman, O’Sullivan, Friesen & Scherer, 1991; 
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Leal, Vrij, Mann & Fisher, 2010), and has been considered important on the grounds that, even if 
we were to assume that any significant results are robust and reliable in a statistical sense, it 
would not necessarily follow that they would have any practical predictive value in the field. In 
other words, the idea here is not to assess whether these cues significantly predict veracity (as by 
the criterion for selection, inevitably they must), but the relative extent to which they might 
predict veracity, assuming they are reliable.  
 
Procedure and materials for case by case analysis 
The cues considered in this analysis were those that had significantly discriminated between liars 
and truth-tellers on two-tailed tests in the previous analyses (expressions of positive emotion 
towards the relative as a dichotomous variable, expressions of hope, references to norms of 
emotion or behaviour, equivocation, gaze aversion, and head shaking).  For each case (appeal), 
the frequency score produced by that individual for each of the cues was compared with the 
overall cue mean.  For the deceptive appeals, cue scores that fell above the cue mean on the cues 
to deception (equivocation, gaze aversion, and head shaking) were classified as a ‘hit’, and cue 
scores that fell below the cue mean on cues to honesty (expressions of hope, and references to 
norms of emotion or behaviour) were also classified as a ‘hit’.  For the honest appeals, cue scores 
that fell above the cue mean on cues to honesty were classified as a ‘hit’, along with cue scores 
that fell below the cue mean on cues to deception.  The cue ‘expressions of positive emotion 
towards the relative’ (which related to honesty when coded dichotomously as present/absent), 
was classified as a ‘hit’ if present in an honest appeal, and a ‘hit’ if absent in a deceptive appeal.  
In this way, a percentage of ‘hits’ was calculated for each cue (i.e. the percentage number of 
cases in which a ‘hit’ was scored).  
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Results for case by case analysis 
The individual cues had hit rates between 79% (gaze aversion) and 65% (expressions of hope). 
See Table 3 for details.  
 The information from the cues was then combined to classify individual cases (appeals) 
as deceptive or truthful.  For each case, the number of ‘hits’ on the cues was calculated (ie. the 
number of times the appealer scored in the expected direction on each of the cues).  Cases which 
scored above 50% ‘hits’ on the cues were categorised as correctly classified (the appealer scored 
in the expected direction on the majority of the cues).  Cases which scored 50% ‘hits’ on the cues 
were categorised as unclassified, and cases that scored below 50% ‘hits’ on the cues were 
categorised as misclassified (the appealer did not score in the expected direction on the majority 
of the cues).  In this way, 12 deceptive appealers were correctly classified (75%), 2 were 
unclassified (13%) and 2 were misclassified (13%).  Of the honest appealers, 13 were correctly 
classified (81%), 1 was unclassified (6%) and 2 were misclassified (13%).  Overall, therefore, 
using these criteria, 78% of cases were correctly classified, 9% were unclassified and 13% were 
misclassified. 
 
 
General Discussion 
 
The present study contributes to the small body of existing research that has examined cues 
related to deception in real life, high stakes situations, and may have implications for our 
understanding of deceptive behaviour across high stakes contexts, and also within a very specific 
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context.  In particular, the findings support DePaulo and Morris’s (2004) contention that, 
although in the kinds of low stakes situations found in laboratory situations cues to deception 
may be difficult to detect, in real life, highly charged situations in which motivation is strong, 
and consequences are serious, more reliable cues to deception may emerge. 
Nevertheless, given the variety of cues that were identified as of possible use, it is 
difficult to explain them in terms of any single, overarching, theoretical perspective, although 
some are more readily accommodated by existing theoretical viewpoints than others.  For 
example, a number of behaviours which have previously been found to discriminate between 
honesty and deception in other real life, high stakes contexts, also appeared to discriminate in the 
present study.  Thus, equivocation, speech errors, gaze aversion, and head shaking were found to 
be significantly, or near significantly, more prevalent in deceptive appeals than in honest appeals.  
Of these gaze aversion is of particular interest given that it was the most successful cue for 
predicting veracity (79% correct), yet previous research in low stakes deception situations has 
shown that gaze aversion is not related to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003), or even that liars may 
increase eye contact in an attempt to appear honest, or monitor how their receiver is responding 
to their lies (Mann et al., 2012).  As noted earlier, there are a variety of a priori reasons why we 
might expect gaze aversion to increase with deception; these include affective reactions to 
feelings of shame and guilt (DePaulo et al., 2003; Ekman, 1992), emotions that may be 
particularly relevant in the context of somebody who is lying about killing their own relative, or 
increased cognitive load whilst lying (Vrij & Mann, 2001a).  However, particularly in the present 
context, it is possible that increased gaze aversion may also be used as a form of distancing 
behaviour.  Honest appeals are likely to be a genuine attempt to communicate with the public 
and ask for help, hence honest appealers are more likely to behave in a way that facilitates this 
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communication; for example, by using direct eye contact.  Nevertheless, the motivation of 
deceptive appealers is clearly not the same, as they do not actually want the public to assist in 
finding out what happened to their relative.  Deceptive appealers may, therefore, produce 
behaviours that inhibit direct communication, such as, gaze aversion.  It is also notable that, in 
their meta-analysis, De Paulo et al. (2003) argue that deception may be associated with linguistic 
constructions that distance the liar from the subject of their speech.  In the same way, therefore, 
equivocal language could also be construed as a form of psychological evasion or distancing 
from feelings of guilt (Zuckerman et al., 1981), or an attempt to evade or diminish the 
psychological conflict produced by the discrepancy between the deceptive appealers’ knowledge 
of their own guilt, and their appeals for help.  
 The finding that deceptive appealers produce more head shaking than honest appealers is 
also in line with some previous research on real life, high stakes lies (Davis et al., 2005; Mann et 
al., 2006).  Some researchers have suggested that this may be a piece of deliberately exaggerated 
behaviour intended to convey an appearance of honesty; i.e. an example of ‘protesting too much’ 
in a Shakespearean sense (Davis et al., 2005).  Alternatively, or additionally, head shaking could 
be construed as a ‘leakage’ cue (Ekman, 1992); i.e. a manifestation of the negative emotions that 
the appealer is experiencing as a consequence of his or her deception.  It is not clear from the 
present study which explanation may be more appropriate; the head shakes varied in magnitude 
from very small to quite large movements; it could be that the former are more indicative of 
leakage, and the latter of exaggerated behaviour.  This possible distinction may be worth 
following up in future research.  The finding of a possible trend for deceptive appeals to contain 
more speech errors than honest appeals, also lends some support to findings from previous 
research on high stakes lies; speech errors in high stakes situations have variously been 
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interpreted as resulting from increased anxiety and fear of apprehension (Davis et al., 2005; 
Ekman, 1992), and cognitive load (Vrij & Mann, 2001a). 
However, although to some extent it may be possible to explain the aforementioned cues 
in terms of general factors such as cognitive load, negative affective reaction, arousal, leakage, 
and distancing, in addition to these more familiar cues, the present study also drew attention to 
some more novel cues that are less obviously explicable in these ways, and might be more 
specifically related to the context of making an appeal.  For example, ‘references to norms of 
emotion and behaviour’ were significantly more prevalent in honest appeals than in deceptive 
appeals, and honest appeals contained significantly more ‘expressions of hope of finding the 
missing relative alive’ than deceptive appeals in cases in which a body had not been found. 
Honest appeals were also significantly more likely to include an ‘expression of positive emotion’ 
towards the relative than deceptive appeals.  Furthermore, honest appeals contained marginally 
significantly more ‘expressions of concern for the relative, or of grief, or pain’, and ‘avoidance 
of the use of brutal language or detail’.  These findings would appear to endorse the view that, 
although theoretical approaches to cues to deception have traditionally focused on a range of 
emotions that may be generally associated with the act of deception, for example, fear, anxiety, 
guilt, shame and excitement (Ekman, 1992; Zuckerman et al., 1981), in high stakes contexts, 
such as that of making an appeal for a missing or murdered relative, the patterns of emotion may 
be more complex and context specific, requiring a different kind of explanation.  For instance, 
broadly speaking, these additional, more context specific cues might be better accommodated by 
what we could term a ‘social interactionist’ perspective. That is, within the context of the kinds 
of cases used here, where there are offenders and victims, some cues to deception reflect the 
nature of the social relationships between the offender and the victim, and corresponding 
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attitudes.  So, for example, whilst it might be expected that somebody making an honest appeal 
would be more likely to express positive emotion towards his or her relative, somebody who has 
recently killed his or her relative may lack the same positive emotion towards the relative 
(indeed, the act of murdering the victim could be construed as an obvious manifestation of this).  
Similarly, one might expect that someone making an honest appeal would produce more 
expressions of concern, grief, or pain about the disappearance or death of the relative, than 
somebody who has recently killed the relative.  Also, whereas an honest appealer may be averse 
to expressing any brutality towards their relative, a deceptive appealer may not be so reluctant.  
 In cases in which the relative was not publicly known to be dead, honest appealers were 
also found to produce more ‘expressions of hope of finding their relative alive’ than deceptive 
appealers.  From a social interactionist perspective, this might simply be a cognitively driven 
behaviour that reflects an obvious change in the status of the victim within their interaction; i.e. 
the deceptive appealers (except in one case where the relative was kidnapped but still alive), 
knew that their relative was already dead and would, therefore, have no spontaneous reason for 
expressing such hope.  Furthermore, honest appeals contained more ‘references to norms of 
emotion and behaviour’ (including violations of norms) than deceptive appeals; this may, in part, 
also be a cognitively driven behaviour reflecting the nature of the interaction between offender 
and victim.  When honest appealers ask, ‘how could somebody do this?’ or, ‘why would 
anybody want to hurt her?’, they are presumably asking a genuine question to which they do not 
know the answer.  A deceptive appealer, however, knows from personal experience how and 
why somebody could kill their relative.  Although an additional possibility is that, in an attempt 
to mitigate cognitive dissonance, deceptive appealers may be less likely to refer to norms of 
emotion and behaviours which they know that they have violated.  
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 Another, possibly related, way of interpreting some of these cues is in terms of what we 
can call the ‘individual behavioural profile’ account of deception.  This has yet to be 
systematically applied to studies of deception.  According to this account, some cues may reflect 
general characteristics associated with the kinds of individuals who commit the crimes that the 
deceptive appealers have committed in a particular context (and who subsequently lie), rather 
than their acts of deception per se.  That is, the cues may form part of the behavioural profile of 
individuals who engage in particular aberrant acts.  In the present cases, and with most other high 
stakes deception contexts, honest and deceptive people differed not only in terms of whether they 
were lying, but also whether they had committed, or had been accomplices to, serious crimes of 
violence.  For example, as with lying itself, showing fewer signs of positive emotion and 
empathy towards the victim, a failure to use references to appropriate norms of behaviour, and 
the use of brutal or aggressive language, could all be construed as consistent with the stereotype 
of a psychopath (Davies & Feldman, 1981).  However, individual profile behaviours of this kind 
will obviously not be identifiable in standard low stakes laboratory situations where ‘normal’ 
participants are randomly assigned to lying and truthful conditions, and also, because they relate 
to deceptive individuals rather than deceptive behaviours, they may not be apparent in within 
subjects comparisons of truthful and deceptive conditions, even in high stakes situations.  
 To summarise, the present study was obviously limited in scope, both in terms of the 
sample size and the range of robust statistically significant results, and obviously requires 
replication before firm conclusions can be drawn.  It is also unclear as to the extent to which the 
cues identified here are specific to the context of making an appeal for help with a missing or 
murdered relative.  Nevertheless, the fact that the combined information from the cues correctly 
classified 78% of the appeals, suggests that a multi-cue perspective using the kinds of cues 
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identified here may be worth investigating further.  Notably, the only individual cue that was 
equivalent in terms of the ability to predict was gaze aversion, but it was not possible to measure 
this in every case.  This illustrates a general problem with using a restricted range of cues; i.e. it 
may not always be possible to identify them in practice.  Given that researchers such as ten 
Brinke and Porter (2012), and Vrij and Mann (2004) have argued a multi-cue approach is more 
likely to be more successful in the field, hopefully, the present research has possibly pointed to 
new directions to explore in this respect. 
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Table 1 
Frequency of case evidence used to establish ground truth  
 
 
Honest appeals 
(n = 16) 
Deceptive appeals 
(n = 16) 
Evidence type   
Forensic evidence (soil, pollen, fibre, blood spatter patterns 
etc) 
14 7 
DNA evidence (body fluids, hair, skin etc.) 3 4 
Victim’s blood 1 4 
CCTV/video/speed camera evidence 6 3  
Knowledge of location of victim’s body 3 3 
Knowledge of unreleased/undiscovered details of crime 3  3 
Confession  8 7 
Admission at trial 7 6  
Post mortem evidence 1 5  
Medical evidence 0 1 
Computer search history of location of crime/body 2 0 
Eyewitness testimony 5 5 
Possession of murder weapon (appealer/accomplice) 0 2 
Possession of items from crime scene 1 0 
Phone records 0 2 
Incriminating financial transactions 1 3  
Account/alibi inconsistent with evidence 5 11 
Note: totals exceed sample size as cases were classified based on several pieces of evidence  
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Table 2 
Inter-rater reliability, percentage means (SDs), confidence intervals, and effect sizes for verbal 
and nonverbal cues 
 Inter-rater 
reliability 
(r) 
Deceptive 
Mean (SD) 
CI 
Honest 
Mean (SD) 
CI 
Effect size 
Verbal cues to 
honesty 
    
Positive emotion 
towards relativea 
 
r = 1 
p < .001 
1.90 (3.77) 
0.13 – 3.68 
3.70 (3.15) 
1.93 – 5.47 
d = 0.52 
Avoids brutal 
language/detail* 
 
r = 1 
p < .001 
0.36 (0.96) 
-0.29 – 1.00 
1.19 (1.51) 
0.54 – 1.83 
d = 0.65 
Expressions of hope** 
 
 
r = 1 
p < .001 
0.63 (0.94) 
-0.047 – 1.301 
1.91 (0.60) 
0.904 – 3.630 
d = 1.62 
Makes a plea 
 
 
r = 1 
p < .001 
3.77 (4.52) 
1.87 – 5.67 
2.69 (2.68) 
0.79 – 4.58 
d = 0.29 
Expressions of concern 
/pain* 
 
r = .90 
p = .003 
1.47 (2.11) 
-0.24 – 3.17 
3.74 (4.22) 
2.04 – 5.45  
d = 0.68 
References to norms of 
emotion or 
behaviour** 
 
r = 1 
p < .001 
0.08 (0.24) 
-0.50 – 0.65 
0.98 (1.58) 
0.40 – 1.55 
d = 0.78 
Verbal cues to 
deception 
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Equivocation**  
 
 
r = 1 
p < .001 
4.69 (4.40) 
2.93 – 6.45 
2.03 (2.07) 
0.27 – 3.78 
d = 0.77 
Speech errors* 
 
 
r = .98 
p < .001 
4.90 (3.75) 
3.39 – 6.41 
2.89 (1.85) 
1.38 – 4.40 
d = 0.68 
Phrase repetition 
 
 
r = .98 
p < .001 
4.84 (4.92) 
2.71 – 6.97 
4.72 (3.25) 
2.59 – 6.84 
d = 0.03 
Filled pauses 
 
 
r = 1 
p < .001 
1.47 (1.79) 
0.60 – 2.34 
1.10 (1.62) 
0.23 – 1.97 
d = 0.22 
Does not  make sense 
 
 
All cases 
checked 0 
0.68 (1.07) 
0.24 – 1.13 
0.42 (0.61) 
-0.03 – 0.86 
d = 0.31 
Avoids using 1st person 
pronoun 
 
r = 1 
p < .001 
0.81 (1.32) 
0.07 – 1.56 
0.82 (1.59) 
0.08 – 1.57 
d = 0.01 
Refers to others 
 
 
r = 1 
p < .001 
1.39 (1.75) 
0.39 – 2.38 
2.13 (2.13) 
1.13 – 3.12 
d = 0.38 
Lack of hope 
 
 
All cases 
checked 0 
0.67 (2.11) 
-.32 – 1.66 
0.00 (0.00) 
-0.99 – 0.99 
d = 0.45 
Lists  
 
 
r = 1 
p < .001 
0.54 (0.89) 
0.11 – 0.96 
0.10 (0.77) 
0.57 – 1.42 
d = 0.55 
Irrelevant statements r = 1 0.49 (0.90) 0.22 (0.76) d = 0.33 
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p < .001 0.07 – 0.91 -0.21 – 0.64 
Uses brutal 
language/detail 
 
r = 1 
p < .001 
0.38 (0.95) 
0.03 – 0.73 
0.06 (0.19) 
-0.29 – 0.42 
d = 0.46 
Nonverbal cues to 
deception 
    
Gaze aversion** 
 
 
r = 1 
p < .001 
59.35 (30.50) 
42.20 – 76.50 
23.53 (23.26) 
1.07 – 45.98 
d = 1.32 
Headshaking** 
 
 
r = .98 
p < .001 
25.26 (24.13) 
15.37 – 35.14 
11.04 (12.94) 
1.16 – 20.92 
d = 0.73 
Shrugging 
 
r = .93 
p = .001 
2.19 (4.33) 
-0.36 – 4.73 
1.77 (4.58) 
-0.52 – 4.07 
d = 0.09 
Note: a Cue differs significantly between deceptive/honest appeals when coded dichotomously as present/absent (χ2(1) 
= 4.50, p = .034). 
** Means differ significantly from each other on a two-tailed test 
* Means differ significantly from each other on a one-tailed test 
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Table 3 
Cue hit rates  
 Hits 
Deceptive appeals 
Hits 
Honest appeals 
Hits 
All appeals 
Positive emotion towards 
relative 
 
69% 
(11/16 cases) 
69% 
(11/16 cases) 
69% 
(22/32 cases) 
Expressions of hope 
 
 
70% 
(7/10 cases) 
60% 
(6/10 cases) 
65% 
(13/20 cases) 
References to norms of 
emotion or behaviour 
 
94% 
(15/16 cases) 
44% 
(7/16 cases) 
69% 
(22/32 cases) 
Equivocation 
 
 
56% 
(9/16 cases) 
81% 
(13/16 cases) 
69% 
(22/32 cases) 
Gaze aversion 
 
 
75% 
(9/12 cases) 
86% 
(6/7 cases) 
79% 
(15/19 cases) 
Headshaking 
 
56% 
(9/16 cases) 
81% 
(13/16 cases) 
69% 
(22/32 cases) 
 
 
